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Abstract
Manipulating reported earnings is a temptation faced by accountants and ﬁ  nancial 
professionals around the world.  Manipulating, or “managing,” one’s accounting 
earnings takes a variety of forms and includes not only the avoidance of prescribed 
accounting rules but also the practice of selectively choosing accounting estimates or 
timing operating decisions to move reported earnings toward a desired goal.  Prior 
research reveals wide disagreement regarding the perceived ethical acceptability of 
this practice.  This study investigates whether national origin inﬂ  uences perceptions 
of earnings management.  Participants from the United States and Mexico evaluated 
thirteen vignettes describing various earnings management practices (Merchant and 
Rockness 1994). Analyses of the responses indicate considerable variation between 
students from these two countries, indicating culture does signiﬁ  cantly impact how 
individuals perceive opportunities to manage reported ﬁ  nancial information.
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Resumen
La manipulación de las utilidades reportadas es una tentación que enfrentan los con-
tadores y profesionistas ﬁ  nancieros en todo el mundo. Manipular o “administrar”, 
las utilidades en la contabilidad toma diferentes formas e incluye no sólo el evitar 
los principios contables prescritos, sino también la práctica de escoger selectiva-
mente estimaciones contables o retrasar decisiones operativas para informar de las 
utilidades conforme a un objetivo deseado. Investigación previa revela un amplio 
desacuerdo en la percepción y aceptación  ética  de esta práctica.
Este estudio investiga si el origen nacional inﬂ  uye en las percepciones éticas de 
la administración de las ganancias. Para ello, aplicamos un cuestionario de 13 
preguntas a  estudiantes de Contaduría de varias escuelas en  México y los Estados 
Unidos;  mismas que describen diversas prácticas en la administración de las utili-
dades ( Merchant y Rockness, 1994). El análisis de las respuestas de los encuestados 
indican una variación considerable entre estudiantes de ambos países, lo cual conﬁ  r-
ma que la cultura afecta signiﬁ  cativamente en  la forma cómo los individuos perciben 
las oportunidades para administrar la información ﬁ  nanciera reportada.
Palabras clave: Origen Nacional, Manipulación de Información Financiera, Cultura, 
Ética.
     
I. Introduction
W
e are constantly bombarded with news of corporate wrongdoing.  Hardly a 
month goes by without the announcement of someone, or some company, ac-
ting unethically in the context of ﬁ  nancial reporting in the US (Jubak, 2002; Grimsley, 
2002; U.S. House of Representatives, 2002) and abroad (Main, 2002). Accordingly, 
the evaluation of ethical behavior in ﬁ  nancial reporting continues to be an important 
issue in business practice and in the preparation and evaluation of ﬁ  nancial informa-
tion.  The examination of individual ethical perceptions is especially germane to the 
assessment of the overall ethical climate in our growing international business com-
munity.  With the continued expansion of companies into the “global marketplace,” 
it is increasingly important to examine the ethical perceptions of individuals from 
various cultures in an attempt to evaluate the ethical climate that may exist, and the-
refore the potential tendency for misleading ﬁ  nancial information in this burgeoning 
ﬁ  nancial marketplace.  
The purpose of this study is to increase our understanding of current ethical perceptio-
ns regarding the ﬁ  nancial reporting practice of “earnings management” (i.e., income Núm. 223, septiembre-diciembre 2007: 53-68
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smoothing, or manipulating income toward a desired goal), and whether those per-
ceptions may be inﬂ  uenced by national culture.  Speciﬁ  cally, we use an instrument 
previously developed by Merchant and Rockness (1994) to study Mexican and U.S. 
students’ perceptions of the practice of earnings management. The instrument requires 
that students’ provide perceptions of the “appropriateness” of earnings management 
under various scenarios. 
The ﬁ  rst part of the paper presents the theory and hypothesis development. The me-
thodology and results are presented in the second and third sections.  Future research 
and policy considerations are provided in the ﬁ  nal section. 
II. Background and Hypotheses
Earnings Management
Manipulating reported earnings is a very real temptation faced by all accountants 
and ﬁ  nancial professionals (Healy, 1985; Jones, 1991; Guenther, 1994; Healy and 
Wahlen, 2000; Matsumoto, 2002; Moehrle, 2002).  Manipulating, or “managing,” 
one’s earnings takes a variety of forms and includes the practice of selective-
ly choosing accounting estimates or timing operating or investment decisions 
to move reported earnings either upwards or downwards toward a desired goal 
(Schipper, 1989; Merchant and Rockness, 1994; Healy and Wahlen, 2000).  Prior 
research reveals considerable disagreement regarding the ethical acceptability 
of the practice of managing earnings (Bruns and Merchant, 1990; Merchant and 
Rockness, 1994; Fischer and Rosenzweig, 1995). While some individuals view 
these decisions as part of the typical set of ﬁ  nancial reporting decisions and res-
ponsibilities, others view them as attempts to intentionally mislead the ﬁ  nancial 
community (Mintz, 1997). 
Earnings management is one of the most important ethical issues accountants face 
in everyday practice around the world (Armstrong, 1993).  Investors and creditors 
in every nation depend on accountants to provide fair and reliable ﬁ  nancial infor-
mation regardless of national orientation.  Financial statement users must be certain 
that companies report accurate information on which their decisions must be based.   
Companies that engage in earnings management may mislead the public regarding 
the true economic proﬁ  tability and/or variability and sustainability of their opera-
tions.  If truthful reporting does not exist, investors might be led to pay a premium 
to purchase the company’s shares, and creditors might be led to lend money at a 
rate not commensurate with the underlying economic risk of the company.Marshall A. Geiger, Carmen Quirvan y Alejandro Hazera 
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Although professional standards in all countries require accountants to present unbia-
sed information (Choi et al., 1999), there are many ways to “manage” a company’s 
reported accounting earnings (Schipper, 1989; Armstrong, 1993).  A few examples of 
earnings management would include a company delaying the recognition of expenses 
or increasing its reported proﬁ  ts or assets to avoid violating existing debt covenants, 
or a group of executives intentionally delaying the signing of a proﬁ  table contract 
or underreporting company earnings in order to negotiate a favorable price in an 
anticipated management buyout offer.  Company executives might also manage ex-
ternally reported earnings in order to increase their bonus compensation, obtain loans 
on more favorable terms, increase or maintain the company’s stock price, or report a 
smooth year-to-year revenues and earnings growth.
A large body of anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that individuals or com-
panies practice earnings management (Healy and Wahlen, 2000). Additionally, regu-
lators in the US have also long expressed concern regarding the practice of earnings 
management (US House of Representatives, 1985, 1990).  Former SEC (Securities 
and Exchange Commission) Chairman Arthur Levitt repeatedly voiced his concern 
that a growing number of corporations were eroding the quality of their ﬁ  nancial 
reports by managing their reported earnings and presenting a skewed portrayal of the 
ﬁ  nancial condition of their companies through the practice of earnings management 
(Levitt, 1998, 2000). Earnings management practices such as the practice of income 
smoothing are also well documented in countries outside of the US (Choi and Ba-
vishi, 1983; Wallace et al., 1991).  Consistent with these ﬁ  ndings Ball et al. (2000) 
conclude that corporate earnings patterns differ across countries due to varied inter-
national institutional factors.
Building on these earlier works, this study investigates whether national culture may 
inﬂ  uence individual perceptions and judgments regarding the ethical acceptability of 
earnings management. An understanding of national differences in ethical judgments 
may be necessary to help interpret earlier research results and, from a practical pers-
pective, becomes increasingly important as global trade and investment increase and 
as business people rely more heavily on ﬁ  nancial statements prepared by individuals 
from foreign countries.  
National Origin and Perceptions of Earnings Management
Ethical decision-making is deeply rooted in cultural values.  Cultural norms con-
cerning what is “right” and “wrong,” “acceptable” and “unacceptable,” “good” and 
“bad”, and “important” and “unimportant” shape one’s beliefs regarding the world 
around us, including the business environment. These individual  beliefs, then, gui-Núm. 223, septiembre-diciembre 2007: 53-68
An International Comparison of Student Perceptions of Earnings Management
 
57
de perceptions of speciﬁ  c decisions, including the practice of earnings management 
(Fritzsche, 1988).  
Several prior studies (e.g., Becker and Fritsche, 1987; Karnes et al., 1989: Shultz et 
al., 1993) suggest that ethical judgments in business are inﬂ  uenced by national origin.  
For example, Becker and Fritsche (1987) compared the ethical beliefs of marketing 
managers from the US, France, and Germany, and found signiﬁ  cant differences rela-
ted to nationality.  Karnes et al. (1989) studied the ethical perceptions of accountants 
from the US and Taiwan.  The US accountants were found to be more concerned 
about the legal consequences of their actions, while the Taiwanese accountants were 
more concerned about how their group would be affected.  Cohen et al. (1996) found 
that auditor decision-making differed across countries.  Roxas and Stoneback (1997) 
found that the ethical decision-making processes and the perceptions of accountants’ 
responsibilities also differ across different cultures.  Further, while seemingly simi-
lar, Whipple and Swords (1992) and Okleshen and Hoyt (1996) found that business 
students in the US have different ethical beliefs than business students in the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand.  In a small sample study, Clikeman et al. (2001) found 
Asian students to view earnings management similarly to US students. 
In this study, we extend these works by examining individuals from the US and Mexi-
co regarding their ethical perceptions.  Prior studies have examined broad differences 
in perceptions of general business ethical dilemmas across cultures. However, only 
recently have researchers begun to examine explicit perceptions toward the broad 
practice of earnings management. Most notable, Geiger et al. (2006) provide eviden-
ce that national origin affects perceptions of earnings management in countries in 
the English-speaking world and Europe. Our current article augments the research of 
Geiger et al. (2006) by examining differences in perceptions of earnings management 
between Mexico and the United States. 
Perceptions of Earnings Management in Mexico and the United States
Merchant and Rockness (1994) report that judgments regarding the ethical accepta-
bility of earnings management may depend on the type of the manipulation.  Accor-
dingly, we would expect that individuals from different countries would vary in their 
perceptions of earnings management on these different situational factors.  
The factor addressed in our study is the type (TYPE) of earnings manipulation.  Ear-
nings can be manipulated either by altering the recording of existing transactions 
(accounting manipulations – ACC), or by timing operating activities near year-end to 
move revenues and expenses into desired periods (operating manipulations-OPER). 
Merchant and Rockness (1994) report that accountants judge accounting manipula-Marshall A. Geiger, Carmen Quirvan y Alejandro Hazera 
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tions to be more serious ethical violations then operating manipulations.  That is, the 
acceptability of breaking an accounting rule to accomplish earnings manipulation is 
less tolerable than engaging in operating manipulations.  
Deeply rooted cultural differences between Mexico and the United States may affect 
those countries’ perceptions of earnings management. With regard to the US, in his 
classic 1988 article,  Gray argues that US business relations are based on arms’ leng-
th transactions between independent third parties.2 Given these conﬂ  icting interests, 
transactions must be supported by detailed, legally enforceable contracts which out-
line the parties’ consideration and obligations. 
 
This adversarial concept of economic transaction is deeply rooted in the traditional 
“agency theory” concept of the corporate entity (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Under 
this perspective, the corporate entity embodies a contract between shareholders and 
managers. In this agreement, corporate managers agree to administer the corporation’s 
(i.e. the investors’) resources and shareholders agree to compensate management (quite 
often on the basis of shareholder return). This structure is reﬂ  ected in US stock markets, 
which are characterized by large numbers of publicly listed companies, relatively low 
concentration ratios in companies’ ownership structures, and large numbers of “third 
party” investors with only an economic interest in the corporate entity (FASB, (Finan-
cial Accounting Standards Board), CICA (Canandian Institute of Certiﬁ  ed Accountants), 
IMCP (Instituto Mexicano de Contadores Públicos), 1995). 
In this legalistic context, ﬁ  nancial reports are largely seen as a method by which ma-
nagement communicates its representations regarding its contractual obligations to 
the independent shareholders (i.e. owners) of the corporation. Accordingly, ﬁ  nancial 
reports are constructed on the basis of legalistic, detailed accounting rules (i.e. the 
standards of the Financial Accounting Standards Board) which (attempt to) address 
aspects of even complex transactions. As a result, accountants and auditors frequen-
tly take a “rules-oriented” approach which mainly emphasizes ﬁ  nancial statement 
compliance with GAAP.   
In contrast to this strong legal orientation, Gray [1988] argues that business transac-
tions in Latin American societies are based more on the social aspects of relations, 
such as family and friendship ties. This orientation may be reﬂ  ected in traditional 
Mexican businesses, which are based on more  a “closely-held” ownership structure. 
These structures may also be reﬂ  ected in the Mexican Stock Exchange (MSE), which 
2 Gray’s (1988) article was the ﬁ  rst to relate Hostede’s dimensions of culture to accounting standard- set-
ting. A more recent critique of this work is found in Baskerville (2003).Núm. 223, septiembre-diciembre 2007: 53-68
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is characterized by relatively few publicly-listed companies, a high concentration of 
shares in the hands of a few individuals, a relatively few “independent” shareholders 
(FASB, CICA, IMCP, 1995). 
  
In a reﬂ  ection of these characteristics, there is relatively less demand for ﬁ  nancial sta-
tements as a method for verifying management’s obligation to third party investors. 
Also, Mexican GAAP tend to be less detail-oriented than US GAAP. 
Hypotheses
Based on the preceding discussion, we would anticipate that national culture impacts 
individual perceptions regarding earnings management. Speciﬁ  cally, we would ex-
pect that individuals from different countries would differ across their perceptions of 
earnings management. Therefore, our set of hypotheses is:
H1:   Perceptions of earnings manipulations will differ across the two countries.
H2:      Perceptions of accounting rules-based earnings manipulations (ACC) will
     differ across the two countries.
H3:   Perceptions of operating decisions to manipulate based earnings (OPER)
    will differ across the two countries.
H4:   Perceptions of the differences between accounting (ACC) and operating
    (OPER) manipulations (TYPE) will differ across the two countries.
III. Methodology
Earnings Management Questionnaire
The participants answered a questionnaire that asked them to evaluate the ethical ac-
ceptability of 13 earnings management activities.  The scenarios were originally de-
veloped by Bruns and Merchant (1990) and subsequently used by Merchant and Ro-
ckness (1994) and Fischer and Rosenzweig (1995) to study perceptions of the ethics 
of earnings management. The scenarios address relatively simplistic practices such as 
delaying discretionary expenses to increase earnings and the intentional manipulation 
of inventory reserves. Subjects responded to each scenario using a 5-point scale ranging 
from 1 for “ethical practice” to 5 for “totally unethical.” Thus, higher scores indicate 
that the action proposed is perceived as more unethical than actions represented by 
lower scores. (A copy of the questionnaire is included in the Appendix.)Marshall A. Geiger, Carmen Quirvan y Alejandro Hazera 
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The questionnaire also includes activities that vary the type (ACC, OPER, and 
TYPE-accounting versus operating manipulation) of the manipulation. Merchant and 
Rockness (1994) report that professional accountants’ judgments of the ethical acce-
ptability of earnings management are inﬂ  uenced by these factors.  
It should also be noted that in our study we analyze more than one ethical dilemma 
regarding the broad earnings management issue. The use of multiple situations has 
been argued to better capture an individual’s ethical orientation than the use of a sin-
gle, or just a few, ethical scenarios (Randall and Gibson, 1990).
Subjects
The participants in this study were business students from one public and one private 
university in the US and one private and four public universities in Mexico.3  Parti-
cipation was voluntary and the responses to the questionnaire were anonymous.  In 
order to ensure that the students understood the nature of the accounting scenarios, 
participation was limited to upper-level students and data was collected toward the 
end of the courses.  After eliminating unusable responses, we obtained complete data 
for 366 US and 202 Mexican students.
IV. Results and Discussion
Table 1 indicates the mean response to each of the 13 earnings management scena-
rios by country and in the aggregate.  Mean responses varied considerably across the 
scenarios.  In order to better assess differences between the two countries regarding 
responses to the individual questions, and the average overall response, we ran unba-
lanced ANCOVAs that also control for age of the student and whether they were an 
accounting major or not in the ANCOVA models as co-variates.4  The p-values repor-
ted in the last column of Table 1 are for the independent country variable in the type 
III sum of squares analyses for each of these separate ANCOVA models.   
3  In order to get a better cross-section of the perceptions of the individuals from both countries, we used 
multiple sites in the same country to collect our data.  In that way, we believe that we present a better re-
presentation of the general perceptions towards these issues within each country than if we collected data 
from only one or two groups of participants. Accordingly, all country locations have been combined for 
analysis. The US universities were the University of Richmond and the University of Rhode Island. 
  The Mexican universities included Universidad Autónoma de Aguascalientes, Universidad de Monte-
rrey, Universidad del Estado de México, Universidad de San Luis Potosí, Universidad de Tlaxcala.  
4   Separate t-tests ﬁ  nd no signiﬁ  cant difference between the Mexico and US students in terms of average 
age (21.92 vs. 21.74 years, respectively); however, more students from Mexico declared accounting as 
a major (93.2%) than in the US (80.8%).Núm. 223, septiembre-diciembre 2007: 53-68
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An examination of the results in Table 1 indicates that, overall, the US participants 
had slightly higher (mean of 2.673) more negative perceptions of the 13 earnings 
management cases presented than their Mexican peers (mean of 2.541; difference 
is signiﬁ  cant at p<.0226).  Further, on 10 of the 13 individual questions the US and 
Mexican students differed signiﬁ  cantly (p<.05) in their aggregate perception toward 
the earnings management issue presented.  Of these 10 signiﬁ  cantly different respon-
ses to individual scenarios, US participants viewed seven as more unethical (had high 
average scores) than their Mexican peers.  A binomial test rejects (p<.01) this overall 
pattern of 10 out of 13 average response differences as a chance occurrence. Thus, 
we ﬁ  nd that US and Mexican students differ signiﬁ  cantly in their perceptions of the 
acceptability of earnings management practices, with the participants from Mexico 
generally more in favor of the practice than their US counterparts.
Situational Factors that Inﬂ  uenced Judgments
Table 1 (in page 68) also reports the inﬂ  uence of situational factors on the ethical 
judgments for the participants in our study. As previously discussed, earnings can 
be managed either by altering the recording of existing transactions (accounting ma-
nipulation) or by timing year-end transactions to move revenues and expenses into 
the desired reporting period (operating manipulation). The students’ mean respon-
se to the seven accounting manipulation scenarios (ACC) is 2.998. The students’ 
mean response to the six operating manipulation scenarios (OPER) is 2.192. The 
overall difference of 0.805 between ACC and OPER, reﬂ  ecting the difference in type 
of manipulation (TYPE) is signiﬁ  cant at p < .01.  Consistent with their practitioner 
counterparts (Merchant and Rockness, 1994), accounting students ﬁ  nd violations of 
accounting rules more ethically troubling than operating manipulations of income.
Examination of Table 1 also indicates that while participants from both coun-
tries viewed ACC violations more signiﬁ  cant than OPER violations, US students 
viewed the ACC cases, in general, signiﬁ  cantly less favorable than their Mexican 
peers.  However, both groups perceived the OPER case manipulations more similar-
ly (p=.0912). Accordingly, the TYPE results are also signiﬁ  cant, largely due to the 
country differences in the ACC cases.  In sum, the US students appeared to be more 
concerned with the earnings manipulations that would violate established accounting 
rules (ACC) than their Mexican peers, and both groups had similar perceptions of 
operating manipulations (OPER).
 
V. Conclusions
Earnings management is one of the most important practical ethical issues faced by 
accountants.  Accountants are responsible for publishing fair and reliable ﬁ  nancial Marshall A. Geiger, Carmen Quirvan y Alejandro Hazera 
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statements, but many incentives exist for companies to try to move their reported 
earnings toward a desired goal. Prior research reveals wide disagreement among ac-
countants regarding the ethical acceptability of earnings management (Bruns and 
Merchant, 1990; Merchant and Rockness, 1994).
The key ﬁ  nding of this study is that while it is largely acknowledged that the US 
and Mexico have very different national cultures, these differences also are evident 
in student perceptions regarding the ethical acceptability of the practice of earning 
management. The results of our study provide evidence that while students from 
both countries viewed operational earnings management as unethical, U.S. students 
viewed non-compliance with GAAP more seriously than Mexican students. This ﬁ  n-
ding supports the legalistic “rules”-oriented approach to ﬁ  nancial reporting that has 
been adopted in the United States. 
Supporters of this perspective may argue that such strict adherence to detailed rules 
helps prevent accounting earnings manipulation. However, as US accountants lear-
ned in the recent US fraud cases such as Enron (See Moncarz, et al., 2006), simple 
following of the rules may not prevent earnings management when the rules are in-
complete or when the rules do not correspond with ethical or economic substance of 
a transaction. Thus, further research is needed regarding international perceptions of 
earnings management as well as their implications to investors. 
Appendix
Instructions: 
The following questions reﬂ  ect everyday ethical choices.  Please evaluate the prac-
tices as they apply to a major division (annual revenues of, say, $100 million) of a 
billion-dollar public company.  Use the following scale to indicate how you judge 
their acceptability.
1. Ethical  practice.
2.  Questionable practice. I would not say anything to the manager, but it 
makes me uncomfortable.
3.  Minor infraction. The manager should be warned not to do it again.
4.  Serious infraction. The manager should be severely reprimanded.
5.  Totally unethical. The manager should be ﬁ  red.Núm. 223, septiembre-diciembre 2007: 53-68
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Questions:
1.  The division’s headquarters building was scheduled to be painted in 2003.  But 
since proﬁ  t performance was way ahead of budget in 2002, the division general 
manager (GM) decided to have the work done in 2002.  Amount: $150,000.
2.  The GM ordered his employees to defer all discretionary expenditures (e.g., 
travel, advertising, hiring, maintenance) into the next accounting period, so his 
division could make its budgeted proﬁ  t targets.  Expected amount of deferrals: 
$150,000.
a.  The expenses were postponed from February and March until April in 
order to make the ﬁ  rst quarter target.
b.  The expenses were postponed from November and December until 
January in order to make the annual target.
3.  On December 15, a clerk ordered $3,000 of ofﬁ  ce supplies, and the supplies 
were delivered on December 29. This order was a mistake because the GM had 
ordered that no discretionary expenses be incurred for the remainder of the ﬁ  s-
cal year, and the supplies were not urgently needed. The company’s accounting 
policy manual states that ofﬁ  ce supplies are to be recorded as an expense when 
delivered. The GM learned what had happened, and to correct the mistake, he 
asked the accounting department not to record the invoice until February.
4.  In September, the GM realized the division would need strong performance in 
the fourth quarter to reach its budget targets.
a.  He decided to implement a sales program offering liberal payment terms 
to pull some sales that would normally occur next year into the current 
year; customers accepting delivery in the fourth quarter would not have 
to pay the invoice for 120 days.
b.  He ordered manufacturing to work overtime in December so that 
everything possible could be shipped by the end of the year.
c.  He sold some excess assets and realized proﬁ  t of $40,000.
5.  At the beginning of December 2003, the GM realized the division would ex-
ceed its budgeted proﬁ  t targets for the year.Marshall A. Geiger, Carmen Quirvan y Alejandro Hazera 
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a.  He ordered his controller to prepay some expenses (e.g., hotel rooms, 
exhibit expense) for a major trade show to be held in March 2004 and 
to book them as 2003 expenses. Amount: $60,000.
b.  He ordered his controller to develop the rationale for increasing the re-
serve for inventory obsolescence. By taking a pessimistic view of future 
market prospects, the controller was able to identify $700,000 worth of 
ﬁ  nished goods that conservative accounting would say should be fully 
reserved (i.e., written off), even though the GM was fairly conﬁ  dent the 
inventory would still be sold at a later date at close to full price.
6.  The next year, the division sold 70% of the written-off inventory, and a cus-
tomer had indicated some interest in buying the rest of that inventory the fo-
llowing year.  The GM ordered his controller to prepare the rationale for redu-
cing the reserve for obsolescence by $210,000 (i.e., writing up the previously 
written-off goods to full cost). The GM’s motivation for recapturing the proﬁ  t 
was:
a.  To be able to continue working on some important product develop-
ment projects that might have been delayed due to budget constraints.
b.  To make budgeted proﬁ  t targets.
7.  In November 2004, the division was straining to meet budget.  The GM called 
the engagement partner of a consulting ﬁ  rm that was doing some work for the 
division and asked that the ﬁ  rm not send an invoice until next year.  The partner 
agreed.  Estimated work done but not invoiced:
a. $30,000
b. $500,000
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Table 1
Mean Responses to Earnings Management Scenarios
 
*p-values are from the type III sum of squares for the country variable from each 
ANCOVA model using accounting major (0/1) and age as co-variates.
ACC = Accounting manipulations
OPER = Operating manipulations
TYPE = Accounting manipulations less operating manipulations
Scenario
All 
participants
(N=568)
Mexico
(N=202)
United
States
(N=366)
Differences 
between
Countries*
(p-values)
1.    Paint building early 1.289 1.559 1.139 .0001
2a.  Defer expenditures for quarter 2.771 2.569 2.883 .0010
2b.  Defer expenditures for year 3.312 2.980 3.495 .0001
3.    Record supplies next year 3.234 3.223 3.240 .8116
4a.  End of year sales program 2.093 2.168 2.052 .1136
4b.  Overtime in December 1.891 2.153 1.746 .0001
4c.  Sell unused assets 1.799 1.970 1.705 .0031
5a.  Prepay $60K travel expenses 2.678 2.713 2.658 .2539
5b.  Writedown $700K inventory 3.129 2.926 3.242 .0024
6a.  Writeup inventory-product development 2.540 2.317 2.664 .0003
6b.  Writeup inventory-meet budget 2.942 2.391 3.246 .0001
7a.  Delay recording $30K invoice 2.776 2.634 2.855 .0205
7b.  Delay recording $500K invoice 3.685 3.431 3.825 .0001
                      Average 2.626 2.541 2.673 .0226
ACC    (3 + 5a + 5b + 6a + 6b + 7a + 7b)/7 2.998 2.805 3.104 .0001
OPER  (1 + 2a + 2b + 4a + 4b + 4c)/6 2.192 2.233 2.170 .0912
TYPE    ACC - OPER 0.805 0.571 0.935 .0001
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